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OPERATIONAL AND MISSION READINESS IMPACT  
OF ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING DEPLOYMENT IN THE  
NAVY SUPPLY CHAIN 
ABSTRACT 
 This project will examine the operational and mission availability of ships 
deployed with an integrated additive manufacturing (AM) capability. The purpose of this 
research is to determine the best option with regard to operational availability, mission 
availability and total ownership costs to the Navy. 
 The objectives of this project will include a comparative analysis based on three 
separate scenarios that will seek to compare the operational impact cost against the total 
ownership cost for the Navy. The first scenario will be a baseline to show the operational 
availability, mission availability and total cost to the Navy utilizing the standard supply 
system; the second scenario integrates the use of AM onboard the USS John C. Stennis 
(CVN 74); the third scenario will integrate the AM machine that will be used to 
manufacture the required part at a centralized shore facility in the Fifth Fleet logistics 
hub. Chapter I will provide an overview and background of the history and 
accomplishments of AM in today’s Navy. Chapter II will include the literature review, 
and more specifically, an introduction of the formulas that will be used later in this 
research. Chapter III illustrates the data that was identified in the research and provides 
an analysis of how the data meets the objectives of this study. Chapter IV will discuss the 
results and provide recommendations. Chapter V will provide final thoughts and possible 
areas for further research. 
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This chapter provides an illustration of this report by discussing several key 
foundational topics. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Tenets, Additive 
Manufacturing (AM) Twenty-Year Vision and AM Implementation Plan will be discussed 
first as they summarize the purpose of this research. Then we will provide further 
background into the work of General Tuttle’s Defense Logistics for the 21st Century in 
order to provide basic knowledge as to why this research is so important. This chapter will 
also briefly discuss the history of AM/3D printing, while showing the current progress the 
Navy has made in applying AM to Navy Surface Forces. Lastly, this chapter will introduce 
the key objectives, problem statement and thesis statement which illustrate the importance 
and purpose of this research. AM is a transformative technology that must be honed and 
treated with the utmost care, without deterring the immense potential that AM has to offer.  
A. REPORT ORGANIZATION  
This joint applied project (JAP) will be completed in five chapters. Chapter I 
discusses the many AM accomplishments in the Navy today, while providing the 
groundwork of knowledge which this research builds upon. The Problem Statement, 
Objectives, Questions, Purpose, Scope and Thesis Statement will also be introduced in this 
chapter. Chapter II will include the literature review on what the scenarios in this research 
are based on. Chapter III will illustrate the data that was identified in the research and an 
analysis of how the data meets the objectives and questions of this study. Chapter IV will 
discuss the findings from Chapter III in greater detail while providing a results-based 
discussion. Lastly, Chapter V will conclude the study with a summary and recommended 




1. CNO’s Tenets 
In order to understand the groundwork from which the AM initiative began it is 
best to describe the CNO’s tenets, shown in Figure 1. These tenets are Warfighting First, 
Operate Forward and Be Ready and are the reason for every acquisition decision, weapon 
system and software development that occurs in today’s Navy. The CNO’s mission is to 
place the warfighter above all else and ensure they are provided with the capabilities to 
operate in all climates, geographic locations and any situation they confront. Warfighters 
must have everything they need to bring the fight to the enemy, whether it’s parts, food or 
weapons. These tenets cultivate an environment of evolution and innovation while 
promoting paradigm shifts, when necessary, and maintaining a steadfast commitment to 
what is most important: lethality.  
Another way that the CNO’s Tenets apply to this joint applied project is that the 
minimization of forward logistics support systems, while providing warfighter needs, is a 
valued commodity in that logistics should not be visible or at the forefront of any conflict. 
As a support function, the best logisticians are not seen or heard; they provide what is 
needed in a timely manner so the warfighter can continue the fight:  
 
Figure 1. Navy AM Vision. Source: OPNAV (2015). 
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The Navy’s AM initiative sprang from this environment of innovation and outside-
the-box thinking. The program began with the chartering of the Naval Additive 
Manufacturing Executive Committee (NAM EXCOMM) back in January of 2015. This 
committee was instituted to support the use, implementation and governance of AM 
throughout the DoN. It is chaired by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (DASN RDT&E), the Deputy Chief of Naval 
Operations for Fleet Readiness and Logistics (N4) and the Deputy Commandant of the 
Marine Corps for Logistics and Readiness (DC I&L). The DCNO N4 stated that AM aligns 
to the CNO’s Tenets by being ready faster and cheaper while operating forward longer, 
which could in turn, “transform our maritime maintenance and logistics supply chain.”  The 
implications of AM are immense and the Navy foresees its use bringing a transformational 
change to the readiness of the forward deployed warfighters: “Imagine fleets of ships, 
aircraft, and vehicles extending their range and payload capabilities while their obsolescent 
parts are reengineered, printed, certified, and returned to combat in a matter of days” 
(Seymour, Joyce, & Louis, n.d.).  
2. AM Twenty-Year Vision 
In section one we discussed the CNO’s Tenets of Be Ready…Faster/Cheaper, 
Operate Forward…Longer, and Warfighting First…and Foremost and how they provide 
the base for which AM initiatives stand on. Now the discussion will turn toward OPNAV 
N4’s twenty-year vision.  
Be Ready…Faster/Cheaper. It can be difficult to understand in this age that a unit 
can be logistically ready faster and cheaper. With the increase of operating costs and future 
plans to increase the Navy’s fleet of ships, without an increase in manning and funding, 
this feat would seem impossible. Nonetheless, in order to maintain the competitive 
advantage over our adversaries, it is important that we continue to improve ourselves and 
continue to remain on the cutting edge of process development and improvement. 
Processes that increase our logistical readiness and guide the DoD to lean efficiency are 
the driving force behind being ready faster and cheaper. With parts on-demand quickly 
becoming the cornerstone of DoD logistics, there must be a course of action that realizes 
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this vision. Furthermore, realizing the twenty-year vision to have a digital warehouse 
instead of physical warehouse will be key in aligning ourselves with the Be Ready tenet. It 
will bring to fruition the ability to make virtually any required part as close to the battle 
space as possible, with little to no customer wait time. It will also mean the decrease of 
transportation costs and lead the Navy to becoming Ready…Faster and Cheaper.  
Operate Forward…Longer. There is much that goes into the Navy’s ability to 
operate in a battle space environment, and perhaps at this point the Navy is pulling back 
the reigns on long deployments by breaking them up for crew-rest purposes. However, 
within the twenty-year vision it is important to plan and be ready for lengthy and extended 
deployments for our battle groups, just in case the need arises. Reducing the logistics 
footprint in the battle space reduces the Navy’s reliance on the Naval Supply System and 
decreases the mountains of material that must be moved forward to sustain our forces. This 
creates a leaner and more efficient Navy that focuses on execution, not sustainment.  
Warfighting First…And Foremost. We just discussed the focus on execution 
instead of sustainment. The twenty-year vision aims at placing the warfighter in the best 
situation to succeed by making logistics so efficient it becomes non-existent to anyone not 
directly involved with logistics. What if Navy logistics became so efficient that the 
warfighter would no longer have to worry about anything other than fighting the battles 
with our adversaries?  It is a fairytale that is not as far off as we believe it is with continued 
innovation and the Navy’s willingness to promote the paradigm shifts that encourage these 
efforts.  
3. Defense Logistics for the 21st Century 
In Defense Logistics for the 21st Century General Tuttle (2013) provides an in-depth 
look at what will be required to successfully implement a new technology.  We will take a 
look at the ways this book provides reasoning on why the proper implementation of AM 
could be the vital link that brings 21st century technology to a DoD logistics system that 
still operates with a 20th century mindset. 
In chapter 1, Tuttle (2013) describes the two most important objectives in logistics:   
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1. Timely delivery of forces and support to the customers 
2. Minimized “footprint” of logistics activities in battle spaces 
Both objectives not only fall in line with the CNO’s Tenets and OPNAV N4’s 
twenty-year logistics vision, but they also provide a logical reasoning as to why it is so 
important to equip all surface platforms, but especially deployers with AM capabilities to 
ensure they are ready to support any war-time tasking they are presented. Through the use 
of AM, customer support can increase and provide its customers with the solution to many 
materiel condition requirements. It also continues the minimization of the requirement for 
so much logistics in the battle space. Tuttle describes the minimization of the logistical 
footprint as the key to the success of any new logistical technology. He states, “New 
technology and logistics management innovation now makes feasible what has long been 
desired-reducing the “iron mountains” of supplies and equipment that used to be required 
to support deployed forces” (Tuttle, 2013). The reduction of the “iron mountains” that 
Tuttle speaks of is especially important because it would create a leaner logistical process 
that provides parts at a moment’s notice to increase operational and mission availability to 
our deploying units.  
Tuttle (2013) also introduces five principles that support the two aforementioned 
objectives: 
1. Accountability for process performance 
2. Continuously shared knowledge of asset status, requirements of the 
campaign, “customer” status, process barriers 
3. Maximized commercial contracting of logistics activities in CONUS, 
forward Bases, and intermediate staging and support bases 
4. Use of the “comparatives advantage” concept for allocation of logistics 
tasks to coalition partners 
5. Simplicity in planning and operations (application of a “principle of 
war”)  
The first supporting principle is of utmost important to this case, in that “it is crucial 
to achieving the process performance standards necessary for both timely delivery and 
minimum footprint.”  Tuttle (2013) goes on to say, “achieving both of those logistics 
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objectives requires significant improvements in process performance over past and present 
practices” (Tuttle, 2013). In reference to AM, the implementation process must be equally 
important to the success of AM as the technology itself. AM execution planners must think 
about not only making the process easy for themselves to implement the technology, but 
they must also think about the Sailors that have to use AM aboard ships. This leads us to 
the fifth principle. 
Simplicity is most times overlooked in an environment with evolving weapon 
systems and procedures, however it cannot be overlooked in the implementation of AM. 
Tuttle states, “processes are complex enough that logisticians and DoD leadership should 
do all they can to simplify them, and certainly should not, out of misplaced bureaucratic 
zeal, add more complexity” (Tuttle, 2013). Sailors and Officers at sea have difficult lives 
and work in extremely fast-paced and dangerous environments that inevitably put them in 
positions where quick decisions must be made in order to save equipment, and more 
importantly, save lives. For this reason, it is vital that the procedures which support AM 
implementation are less taxing on Sailors and Officers and minimize their involvement in 
the decision process on what can and what should be manufactured. The decision-making 
process and manufacturing approvals should be completed off-ship where experts and 
technicians adequately test and analyze manufactured parts in order to provide a detailed 
perspective on what parts are manufacturable and what parts aren’t aboard ships.  
In chapter 6, Tuttle (2013) speaks to maintenance and troubleshooting efforts by 
operators in the field and re-emphasizes the importance of this concept of process 
simplification: “The simpler the diagnosis and removal/replacement tasks permitted by the 
design, the less skill is required of the technician” (Tuttle, 2013). Chapter 6 also goes into 
processes that support the sustainment of customer requirements in the field and how these 
processes are vital in the success to the warfighter. The first process he discusses is 
configuration management. He states, “it is the foundation of all in-service technical and 
logistics support for a system...is the essential part of the configuration part of the 
configuration management process.”  He further discusses the importance of configuration 
management and how “production of systems may stretch over many years, during which 
technology evolves. For example, an avionics component installed in an aircraft in the first 
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year’s production may evolve several times even in initial production” (Tuttle, 2013). For 
this reason, it is important that this management of technical analysis and thought processes 
remain the backbone of AM usage so that the new technology is still in line with different 
part evolutions. This will prevent mistakes at the user level in manufacturing wrong parts.  
Chapter 6 also discusses Lead Time and the two specific types: administrative and 
production. One of the biggest decisions is whether or not to perform a contract-buy or 
repair the item and return it back to the customer. Administrative lead time includes the 
review of engineering drawings, which Tuttle (2013) states can sometimes be “a 
bureaucratically tortuous process.”  After the review of the part drawings the fund approval 
process can be equally as bureaucratic due to the number of approvals required to procure 
the required parts. Once the procurement has been made the production lead time depends 
greatly on the contractor’s ability to obtain the raw materials, subcontract subcomponents, 
if necessary, and conduct separate engineering reviews. All of this prior to the actual 
manufacture of the part. This administrative and production process can be a lengthy 
process with “lead times frequently exceeding two years from the time the process is 
initiated” (Tuttle, 2013). This leads to the follow-on discussion in chapter 8.  
In chapter 8, Tuttle (2013) discusses the failures of the Naval supply system and 
the extent of long lead times through a 2003 GAO report which found: 
In typical 6-month deployments at sea, Navy ships are generally unable to 
meet the Navy’s supply performance goals for spare parts. GAO’s analysis 
of data for 132,000 parts requisitions from ships in 6 Atlantic and Pacific 
battle groups deployed in fiscal years 1999 and 2000 showed that 54 percent 
could be filled from inventories onboard ship. This supply rate falls short of 
Navy’s long-standing 65 percent goal. When parts were requisitioned, 
maintenance crews waited an average of 18.1 days to get the parts-more 
than 3 times the Navy’s wait-time goal of 5.6 days for ships outside the 
continental United States. The Navy recognizes it has not met its supply 
goals for over 20 years.  
Two key problems contribute to the Navy’s inability to achieve its supply 
goals. Its ship configuration records, which identify the types of equipment 
and weapons systems that are installed on a ship, are often inaccurate 
because they are not updated in a timely manner and because audits to 
ensure their accuracy are not conducted periodically. In addition, the Navy’s 
historical demand data are often out-of-date, incomplete, or erroneous 
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because supply crews do not always enter the right information into the 
ships’ supply system databases or do not enter it on a timely basis. Because 
configuration-record and demand data are used in models to estimate what 
a ship needs to carry in inventory, inaccuracies in this information can result 
in a ship’s not stocking the right parts for the equipment on board or not 
carrying the right number of parts that may be needed during deployment… 
While precise impacts are not always well defined, the Navy’s spare parts 
supply problems can affect a deployed ship’s operations, mission readiness, 
and costs. GAO’s analysis of data on 50,000 work orders from 6 deployed 
battle groups showed that 58 percent could not be completed because the 
right parts were not available onboard. More complete reporting of work 
orders identified as critical or important would have resulted in a more 
complete assessment of ship mission readiness. In addition, the Navy 
expends substantial funds-nearly $25 million for 6 ships GAO reviewed-to 
maintain large inventories that are not requisitioned during deployments 
(Tuttle, 2013). 
The GAO report identifies critical gaps in the fulfillment and extended lead times 
of supply requisitions, which could have been mitigated through the widespread use of AM 
throughout the battle group. As major proponents of battle groups, it follows logically that 
outfitting surface ships with their own organic AM capabilities would strengthen the 
readiness of the Navy as a whole.  
In summary, Tuttle (2013) presents an extensive supportive analysis of the need for 
more adequate logistical processes that provide a streamlined approach in minimizing the 
logistics footprint while simplifying the way we do business. This research will seek to 
find a balance between minimizing the forward logistical footprint, and the simplification 
of processes utilizing what has worked in the past to integrate 21st century technology with 
20th century processes. The result should ease the implementation of AM so that it does not 
provide a new and disruptive process and is easier to implement aboard Navy ships.  
4. DON Additive Manufacturing (AM) Implementation Plan V2.0 (2017) 
The purpose of the AM Implementation Plan is to provide overarching guidance on 
DoN’s strategy to “develop, integrate, and operationalize AM” throughout the Navy. It also 
provides goals and objectives in order to standardize the efforts of AM implementation. 
Overall responsibility for the oversight of this plan falls under the Naval Additive 
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Manufacturing Executive Committee (NAM EXCOMM) as discussed earlier. The goals 
and objectives are illustrated in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2. AM Implementation Plan Objectives. Source: Department of the Navy 
(2017).  
Each objective represents important hurdles that must be cleared in order to provide 
widespread usage to AM capabilities.  The ability to certify parts/tools that are 
manufactured with AM more quickly will be integral in the success of the AM 
implementation process. The education, training and NEC development will also show how 
dedicated the Navy is to the implementation of AM. Lastly, the fifth objective describes 
the need to test AM on different platforms in the surface, subsurface, aviation, and 
expeditionary environments.  
5. Guidance on the Use of Additive Manufacturing SER 05T/2018-024 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) came out with its first formal technical 
guidance on the shipboard management of AM in August of 2018. This policy provided 
specific guidance and direction to ships on the “considerations needed to evaluate if, when 
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and how to use AM for given applications and provides the approval requirements for 
differing risk severities” (Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, [SEA 05], 2018). 
Specifically, it provides the approval procedures to authorize components for AM and who 
specifically, is authorized to approve the use of AM aboard ships. It also discusses what 
the purpose of the requirement and the “intended service conditions and service life to 
ensure adequate fit, form, and function” (Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, 
[SEA 05], 2018). 
The direction of this guidance begins with the correct determination of the “Service 
Condition Level” which is broken down into seven severity levels (1-7). Levels 1–3 are 
the most severe and result in CVN loss, ship loss or catastrophic failure. Level 4 is 
considered Critical. Levels 5 & 6 are either Significant and Marginal. Lastly, Level 7 is 
considered Negligible and Not Applicable. It is up to the “design activity” which means 
the ship in this instance. For correct risk assessments and severity levels, ships are required 
to confer with the AM TWH and the Ship Design Manager (SDM). The ship will also need 
to develop testing and qualification standards for the part that is being manufactured and 
must be approved by the appropriate authority.   
The different levels of risk are associated with different levels of approval authority. 
A High Level of Risk can only be approved by the NAVSEA Commander and the 
NAVSEA CHENG. Serious Level of Risk can only be approved by the NAVSEA CHENG 
and Technical Domain Manager/Chief Systems Engineer. Medium Level of Risk may be 
approved by the AM TWH, the component TWH and the SDM TWH. Low Level of Risk 
may be approved by the Waterfront CHENG. For Severity Level 7 or N/A, the ship’s 
Commanding Officer or CHENG may approve. 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the process NAVSEA has approved and released to ships. 
Figure 3 begins with the requirements and what specifically the manufactured part will be 
intended to do. At that point, the severity level will be identified, and if level 7, will be 
authorized by the ship CO or CHENG to manufacture. If the part is considered a level 1–
5, then it must go through the determination on whether the component must be metallic. 
Then the part must go through the process of what metals are required, utilizing the MSR 
T904-AX-GIB-010/100 guidance. Before the component is authorized for manufacture, 
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the component must go through a risk assessment, then another material selection process 
(shown in Figure 3), then Testing and Qualification requirements before generating the 
Technical Data Package and final approval.  Figure 5 displays the AM request form 
required by NAVSEA. 
  
Figure 3. NAVSEA AM Approval Process. Source: NAVSEA (2018). 
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Figure 5. AM Request Form. Source: NAVSEA (2018). 
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6. AM Brief History and Use in Today’s Navy 
AM is not a new technology. It was developed in the mid to late 19th century by 
Frenchman Francois Willeme followed by American J.E. Blanther. Still in a primitive 
form, it was later revolutionized in the 1970s and 80’s by different inventors throughout 
the world. On 27 January 1975, Wyn Kelly Swainson filed patent U.S. 4078229 A for 
creating three dimensional objects using two beams of radiation. In 1981, Japanese 
inventor, Hideo Kodama published the techniques he used in creating parts by hardening 
plastic in multiple layers of photopolymer. In 1984, William E. Masters was granted his 
patent for his first printed object with the device he named the Personal Modeller 2100, 
which was considered by many to be the first ever patent for 3D printing. Masters would 
go on to file two more patents which would pave the way for 3D printing and solidify 
himself as the “Father” of 3D printing. Between the 1980s and 1990s there was an 
explosion of different 3D printers and were headlined by two major events. The first was 
the invention Stereolithography by Charles Hull in 1984, which allowed the development 
of 3D images utilizing digital data (Goldberg, 2018). The second was in 1992, when 
Charles Hull’s startup company, 3D Systems, created the first of its kind, stereolithographic 
apparatus (SLA) machine, which allowed the multiple layering of material to create parts 
faster than ever before (Goldberg, 2018). In the present age (2000s and beyond) AM is in 
an adolescent stage and has been used for countless ideas, including use for creating 
jewelry, shuttle parts for NASA and prototype vehicles with 200 MPG gas mileage. It 
wouldn’t be long before the U.S. military would begin to see the opportunities for greater 
warfighter readiness and capabilities.  
Since the inception of the NAM EXCOMM in 2015, the AM usage rate in the Navy 
has increased significantly as evidenced by over 148 initiatives that have occurred over the 
last three years. In July of 2016, a V-22 component was produced, installed and tested 
during a flight. This event marked the first time an aircraft had flown with a 3D printed 
part that was considered flight critical. An AM fabrication suite was deployed on the USS 
Harry S. Truman (CVN 75) while in the 5th Fleet AOR, in late 2015. Last year, the 
production of a prototype submersible for use by SEAL units was achieved by a combined 
effort from the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) and the Carderock Division’s 
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Disruptive Technology Laboratory (DTL) in just two weeks. Also, in 2017, the Navy 
approved the manufacturing of the first part to come from the Naval supply system. The 
H-1 helmet visor clip is a part that breaks easily during use by Marines in the field and is 
priced at $300.  
In December of 2018, the Sailors of the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) 
collaborated to manufacture an essential rotary joint in the Commercial Broadband System 
Program (CBSP) antenna which brought online the ship’s internet services while on 
deployment to the 5th Fleet area of operations (Leonard, 2018). This example of success 
serves as the reasoning behind this research because it brought about the question of the 
operational impacts of such a loss and other casualties in which AM could bring about the 
most change.   
These successes only scratch the surface of how AM has been introduced to the 
Navy’s maintenance communities. As AM has increased momentum in the Navy, System 
Commands (SYSCOMS) have increased the distribution of community guidance to bring 
awareness to those that may not yet understand its capabilities. NAVSEA’s current 
guidance released 17 August 2018, GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF ADDITIVE 
MANUFACTURING, provides detailed information on how ships should submit approval 
requests for AM certification. The importance of this guidance, although introductory in 
nature, cannot be understated. The use of AM in the Navy will never evolve if it doesn’t 
begin at an infancy stage.  
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Can the Operational Availability (Ao) of deployed ships be improved by integrating 
Additive Manufacturing (AM) into the Navy supply chain? 
With all of the attention and thought that is being placed on AM, there are still many 
unanswered questions with regards to execution. What types of components will be 
allowed?  What are the fabrication procedures?  Who may be allowed to conduct 
component inspections?  Who will be allowed to operate the manufacturing printers and 
what qualifications should they be required to maintain?  There are so many ways that this 
technology may be deployed. This study will discuss and analyze the deployment of AM 
16 
in three different scenarios that provide the use of AM in both a centralized location and 
distributed location.  The centralized location may be either a local Fleet Logistics Center 
(FLC) or regional maintenance facility both of which are shore-based and close in 
proximity to the nearest Navy-centric port. The distributed location in this case study refers 
to the USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) but may very well be substituted for any Naval 
warship.  
In summary, the DoN, NAVSUP and NAVSEA should not only support the global 
expansion of AM technology at Depot and Intermediate level maintenance activities, but 
on U.S. Navy Warships as well. They are, after all, one of the many warfighters the CNO 
describes in his tenets of Warfighting first, Forward Deployed, and Be Ready. 
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The study seeks to determine whether ship deployments can be improved by 
integrating AM within the use of the standard supply chain. In supporting the viability of 
this AM integration, there will be one overarching objective that will be used to examine 
the worthiness of this effort for future ship deployments. This objective will provide a 
scenario-based simulation of a high priority part through AM-applied supply chain 
processes to observe operational availability and cost comparisons, which will be discussed 
further within the methodology section of this chapter. 
E. FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH QUESTION 
With several different paths that one could take in the research of AM, the focal 
question for this research is focused and derived from the objective:   
Does the potential operational impact justify the AM total cost ownership for the Navy? 
F. PURPOSE/BENEFIT 
The purpose of this report is to introduce fresh thoughts and ideas in the 
implementation strategies of AM. Since 2015, the Navy has taken large steps in the process 
of making AM a viable option for several communities. This report will seek to expand on 
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the research already completed and attempt to take the next steps in identifying the best 
method for Navy-wide implementation.  
Depending on the results, the benefits will provide an implementation strategy that 
provides the right amount of oversight on a technology that is evolving and may 
revolutionize the way the Navy thinks about deployable logistics. The intention of this 
paper is not to hinder the rapid movement of AM advancement, but to provide a smart, 
proven approach that will enable control and support creativity. The intent of this research 
is to bring the Supply and Maintenance communities together to increase ship operational 
readiness.  
G. SCOPE/METHODOLOGY 
The research for this study will take the form of three scenarios that will be used in 
a relational comparison of costs that determine the effects of operational availability versus 
the total ownership costs of AM for the Navy. In all three scenarios, the USS John C. 
Stennis (CVN 74) will simulate as the host ship since the concept of these scenarios were 
driven by the success the STENNIS had in its most recent deployment in which they were 
able to bring up a critical system through their use of AM.  
The first scenario will be utilized as a baseline to show the use of the normal supply 
system and the potential costs that would result from requisitioning the required part off 
ship while in the 5th Fleet Area of Responsibility (AOR). This baseline of the normal supply 
chain will be used to determine how the use of AM would fare with regards to costs. The 
simulation will observe the total operating costs of the high priority part required to bring 
the system back online from requisitioning to receipt and installation aboard the ship.  
The second scenario that will be simulated integrates the use of AM aboard 
STENNIS and most resembles the outcome of the actual event that led to the bringing back 
of their broadband capability. This scenario will identify the costs that were associated with 
bringing the mission back online in comparison to the costs from the first scenario.  
The third scenario uses the same situation as the previous two scenarios with the 
exception of the location of the AM machine that will be used to manufacture the required 
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part. In this simulation, instead of having the AM aboard STENNIS, the machine will be 
located at a centralized shore facility. The costs for this scenario will be used in comparison 
against the costs in the previous two scenarios.  
The costs that will be utilized in the discussed cost comparisons are shown in  
Table 1.  
Table 1: Scenario Metrics and Methodology. 
Scenario/ 
Methodology Metrics 
#1 Current supply chain Labor cost = Daily salaries of personnel involved X MDT  
Scenario #1 will provide a baseline 
of supply chain logistics associated 
costs for a comparison of the costs 





Transportation cost = (Cost of fuel for the aircraft used to 
deliver part X Average fuel used per run in December) + Fuel 
cost to fly part from U.S + Daily cost of four pilots/Average 
number of parts carried aboard C-17 within a three-month 
span to Bahrain 
Material cost = Level of expected demand X Average 
material cost for production of each part (for this scenario 
cost will be the price of the part) 
Mean Down Time (MDT) = Troubleshooting time + 
Requisition/Open Purchase time + Part wait time + 
Installation time 
Facility cost = NSA Bahrain average building lease yearly 
rent (includes utilities)/ Time required to manufacture 
Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) = Taken from 
Maintenance Requirement Card (MRC) 
Operational Availability = [MTBM/ (MTBM + MDT)] X 
100% 
Mission Availability = [Mission Uptime/ (Mission uptime + 
Mission downtime)] X 100% 




Scenario #2 will provide calculated 
costs based on the ship able to utilize 
AM with all of the required materiel 
needed to make the part on board. 
Costs will be in comparison with 
scenarios #1 and #3 
Machine cost = Price of machine (UPrint SE Plus)/Number 
of parts manufactured over its lifetime   
Material cost = Cost for raw material that will be used to fix 
the rotary joint 
Facility cost = NSA Bahrain average building lease yearly 
rent (includes utilities)/ Time required to manufacture 
Design/Manufacturing/Approval (DMA) process cost = 
Labor Cost + Machine cost + Material cost for production of 
part + (Additional AM Operator daily labor cost X Time 
required to manufacture) 
Mean Down Time (MDT) = Troubleshooting time + 
Requisition/Open Purchase time + Part wait time + 
Installation time 
Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) = Taken from 
Maintenance Requirement Card (MRC) 
Operational Availability = [MTBM/ (MTBM + MDT)] X 
100% 
Mission Availability = [Mission Uptime/ (Mission uptime + 
Mission downtime)] X 100% 
Transportation cost = Not applicable in scenario two 
#3 Shore facility w/ AM capability Labor cost = Daily salaries of personnel involved X MDT 
Scenario #3 will provide calculated 
costs based on the concept of having 
the part get manufactured at a shore 
facility and flown aboard. The 
calculations will be used in 
comparison to scenarios #1 and #2 
Facility cost = NSA Bahrain average building lease yearly 
rent (includes utilities)/ Time required to manufacture 
Machine cost = Price of machine (UPrint SE Plus)/Number 
of parts manufactured over its lifetime   
Material cost = Cost for raw material that will be used to fix 




Design/Manufacturing/Approval (DMA) process cost = 
Labor Cost + Machine cost + Material cost for production of 
part + (Additional AM Operator daily labor cost X Time 
required to manufacture)  
Mean Down Time (MDT) = Troubleshooting time + 
Requisition/Open Purchase time + Part wait time + 
Installation time 
Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) = Taken from 
Maintenance Requirement Card (MRC) 
Operational Availability = [MTBM/ (MTBM + MDT)] X 
100% 
Mission Availability = [Mission Uptime/ (Mission uptime + 
Mission downtime)] X 100% 
Transportation cost = [(Cost of fuel for the aircraft used to 
deliver part X Average fuel used per run in December) + 
Daily cost of two pilots] /Average number of parts delivered 
to ship 
H. THESIS STATEMENT 
AM is trending upward in usage not only commercially, but within the military as 
well. This study will analyze if ship deployments are best supported by integrating AM 
manufacturing into Navy supply chain logistics processes.   
I. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the CNO’s Tenets and how AM directly results from the 
concept of bringing the warfighter the tools to complete deployments with more success. 
Accomplishments of AM in today’s Navy were also introduced to provide a background 
of these programs in relation to each other. The Problem Statement, Objectives, Questions, 
Purpose, Scope and Thesis Statement were also introduced and will be expanded upon in 
later chapters of this report.  
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The Navy’s growing intentions of making AM a focal point in the future readiness 
of the Surface community provide the next stage of surface logistics. We must harness this 
great technology for the betterment of our Sailors and ships so that they have every tool at 
their disposal to carry-out the Navy’s mission of lethality. This report seeks to discover 
another method for implementing AM aboard ships that will do just that. In the next 
chapter, the literature used in this research will be presented, analyzed and discussed. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. ADDITIVE MANUFACTURING IN THE SPARE PARTS SUPPLY CHAIN 
Within the Literature Review, the introduction of key ideas that will be utilized in 
this research are derived from previous published works. An analysis of the research 
conducted by Siavash H. Khajavi, Jouni Partanen and Jan Holmstrom brings to light several 
concepts which are important to identify. This research was conducted in 2013 and was 
used to “evaluate the potential impact of additive manufacturing improvements on the 
configuration of spare parts supply chains” (Khajavi et al., 2014). It introduces the scenario 
modeling concepts which form the basis for this study. This literature pertained to the F-
18 Super Hornets air-cooling system, which was one of the first implementations of AM 
in Naval Aviation. The four scenarios that are discussed relate to varying supply chain 
configurations with the inclusion of AM technology in observance of total operating costs 
as the critical element. A detailed analysis of this research will be conducted and the 
subsequent relation to this research will be discussed.  
This research begins with the concept of “firms” which can be any organization in 
the business of providing logistical support to customers who require it. In the research 
provided by Khajavi (2014) and Partanen as well as this current research, we shall assume 
that “firms” refers to the U.S. Navy. Firms are currently in the position of spending millions 
of dollars in their supply chain operations “to reach high fulfillment rates and reliability.”  
A direct result of this spending is a disproportionate return on investment in which large 
inventory levels lead to higher obsolescence, warehousing and capital costs due to the 
increase in slow moving parts. Khajavi (2014) goes on to say that “this study investigates 
the effects of utilizing AM to produce spare parts within the structure of the spare parts 
supply chain” (Khajavi et al., 2014). 
One of the more common and foremost issues of supply chains is the uncertainty 
of demand. He goes on to discuss how companies tend to hold more stock in order to meet 
this uncertainty for demand in order to meet the customer’s needs. Based on data from a 
DoD product support conference in 2010, “the military spent $194 billion on its logistics 
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operations and spare parts supply chain management, consisting of $104 billion in supply, 
$70 billion in maintenance and $20 billion in transportation. At the end of the same year, 
the U.S. military held an astonishing 4.6 million stock keeping units of spare parts 
inventory, valued at $94 billion” (Khajavi et al., 2014).  
Khajavi (2014) goes on to speak of the distinction between centralized and 
distributed production within the logistics field. A centralized location concentrates the 
production facilities in specific locations that provide the most geographic sense. With 
regards to the Navy these centralized locations would require access to sea ports and air 
fields, which have already been established through the eight major logistical Navy hubs. 
(1) Norfolk, Virginia 
(2) Jacksonville, Florida 
(3) Bremerton, Washington 
(4) San Diego, California 
(5) Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 
(6) Manama, Bahrain 
(7) Yokosuka, Japan 
(8) Sigonella, Italy 
The distributed production model, in Khajavi’s (2014) work, refers to the 
decentralization of production facilities located in dispersed locations close to the “major 
markets.”  In this case, the distributed model refers to the concept of manufacturing at the 
location of need, which in the Navy is any surface platform, but specifically for the research 
in this case refers to USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74). Khajavi (2014) further states that “a 
common theme in all cases has been an organization’s ability to balance its customers’ 
value with supply chain costs” (Khajavi et al., 2014). In any case, Khajavi (2014) 
recommends to “conduct a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) before making any decision on the 
implementation of a distributed strategy” (Khajavi et al., 2014).  As shown in Figure 6, 
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Khajavi (2014) provided real-world research based on four scenarios in two dimensions, 
comparing the total operating costs for each. 
 
Figure 6. Scenario Methodology. Source: Khajavi (2014). 
The scope in Khajavi’s (2014) research was to focus on the Navy’s F-18 Super 
Hornets and the use of additive manufacturing to produce functional spare parts for the air-
cooling system. Scenario one illustrated the reference, or baseline scenario, which was used 
to show the current practice of the spare parts supplier. Scenarios one and three are based 
on centralized locations, however scenario one, as discussed, is the current logistics 
configuration. Scenario three is the centralized location with future AM enhancements. 
Scenarios two and four are the distributed locations with scenario four including the AM 
enhancements. By “future AM enhancements” Khajavi (2014) states, “the future additive 
manufacturing machine scenarios were designed to assess the impact of AM machine 
development in the reduction of the overall cost of spare part provision.  In the model, a 
future AM machine is realized by altering two of the machine’s key specifications: the 
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automation level and the size of the production chamber.”  In Khajavi’s (2014) research, 
the operating cost of each scenario was formulated utilizing the following data:  
(1) Personnel cost 
(2) Material cost 
(3) Transportation cost 
(4) Inventory carrying cost 
(5) Aircraft downtime cost 
(6) Inventory obsolescence cost 
(7) AM machine cost 
(8) Annualized cost of initial inventory production cost 
Figure 7 summarizes the results from Khajavi’s (2014) research.  Results show that 
scenario one favors the use of the centralized production method due to the high cost of 
AM machines during that time.  Although the personnel cost was much higher in scenario 
two, there was a higher cost in scenario one in transportation, inventory, aircraft downtime 
and obsolescence costs. In comparing scenarios three and four, three had a much higher 
transportation and inventory cost that gave the edge to scenario four.  
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Figure 7. Scenario Methodology with Selected Path. Source: Khajavi (2013). 
B. STENNIS ENGINEERS USE 3D PRINTER TO MAKE REPAIRS TO 
CRITICAL SYSTEMS 
This article written by Mass Communication Specialist Seaman (MCSN) Joshua 
Leonard (2018) while aboard USS John C. Stennis (CVN 74) during the ship’s most recent 
deployment in December of 2018 to the 5th Fleet area of operations sparked the ideas that 
provide the foundation of this work. It sets the stage for the scenarios that will be analyzed 
further and provides important information that this research will use to formulate 
assumptions during the scenario section, such as the time it took to design, manufacture 
and approve the use of the required part, leading to the creation of a formula to calculate 
the cost of this process.  
The article discusses the loss of the commercial broadband system program 
(CBSP), shown in Figures 8 and 9, which is directly linked to the loss of the ship’s internet 
connection, an important shipboard system. The rotary joint was damaged and would not 
allow the antenna to maneuver properly. The CS9 Division Officer, LTJG Tyler Scott 
Grim, stated in the article, “the rotary joint is like a fork on a BMX (motocross bicycle) 
…the gyro allows the fork to spin 360 degrees without getting the brake lines tangled. The 
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rotary joint works like that. It enables the transmit cables to rotate without getting tangled 
while maintaining an electrical connection to the rest of the system” (Leonard, 2018).  
 
Figure 8. CBSP Suite. Source: Harris.com (2019). 
 
Figure 9. CBSP Antenna. Source: Harris.com (2019). 
Since the rotary joint failure was an uncommon part with a low failure rate, the wait 
time for the new part would have been approximately two months. This would have left 
the ship with degraded internet capability for an extended period of time which would have 
been devastating for communication, but operationally as well. Furthermore, the resulting 
loss of any form of internal and external logistics would have severely degraded the ship’s 
operational success.  
The decision to manufacture the required part utilizing AM was a joint effort of the 
ship’s Engineering and Combat System’s personnel. And while the troubleshooting 
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process, in this case, took approximately three weeks, the process of manufacturing the 
part developed quickly. “The entire process from conception to reality took less than a day. 
The temporary fix provided by additive manufacturing allowed the ship to continue 
operating at full capacity, rather than spending four to eight weeks waiting for a 
replacement part to arrive,” Leonard (2018) summarized.  
The key takeaways from this article are that the design, the manufacturing and the 
approval of the required part took one workday. Depending on the required part, these 
processes may require more or less time, but for the scenarios utilized in this research we 
will assume that the time required for this process was 12 hours due to the standard 
workday aboard a deployed ship is generally 12 hours or half a day. In order to attribute a 
cost to this process the following formula has been developed: 
 
Design/Manufacturing/Approval (DMA) process cost = Labor Cost + Machine cost + 
Material cost for production of part + (Additional AM Operator daily labor cost X Time 
required to manufacture) 
The other important piece of information from this article is that it was estimated 
that the part would arrive in 4–8 weeks. After researching the required part further with the 
manufacturer, it was discovered that the time was actually 10 weeks, so that will be the 
time used for the formulas in the scenarios.  
C. OTHER LITERATURE  
1. Supply Chain Modifications to Improve Additive Manufacturing 
Cost-Benefit Balance 
This paper was written in response to Khajavi’s (2014) study and call for more 
research on AM within supply chain logistics. Although this literature does not contain any 
additional empirical data, it does provide some insight as to different supply chain 
strategies and one in particular that the Navy uses on a continual basis:  Postponement 
strategy.  
The Navy has continued on a path in which postponement strategy has become the 
norm. Postponement strategy is used “to reduce the risk, uncertainty and its related costs 
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of different goods in the market by delaying the production until the demand is there” (H. 
Khajavi et al., 2018). Pagh and Cooper describe postponement strategy as the “Just-in-
time” (JIT) production method, which inevitably leads to the reduction of excess 
inventories and forces forecasting to be completed (H. Khajavi et al., 2018). 
However, precise forecasting is already a difficult art, but add the deployment 
schedule of a fully operational Naval surface vessel and it becomes nearly an impossible 
task to determine what will break and when. This research will seek to identify the 
operational and mission impacts and compare these impacts within different supply chain 
models.  
2. The Transition from Operational Availability to Mission Availability 
The case study by J. L. Schmal (2014) goes in depth on the concepts of operational 
and missional availability while trying to find an optimal way that minimizes funding for 
spare parts and meets the minimum mission availability. Schmal (2014) provides the 
formula that will be used to identify operational and mission availability within this 
research:   
 
Operational Availability = Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM)/MTBM + Mean 
Down Time (MDT) X 100% (Schmal, 2014) 
 
Mission Availability = Mission Uptime/Mission uptime + Mission downtime X 100% 
(Schmal, 2014) 
 
Why is Operational Availability and Mission Availability so important to this 
research?  It will determine how effective the addition of AM technology is to the supply 
chain and will show which approach of implementation, whether a shipboard-centric 
(distributed) model or a shore-centric (centralized) model, works best in a deployed 
environment.  
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D. GAP IN LITERATURE 
After analyzing the research of Khajavi (2014), one of the crucial aspects of this 
work was discovering what the effects of AM could be in a distributed logistical concept. 
This work stimulated the thought of applying this research process to the surface Navy 
instead of aviation. During the time of Khajavi’s (2014) research AM technology had not 
reached the implementation stage onboard Navy surface platforms. As substantial as this 
research is, it is unable to provide the Navy with an updated outlook on how a distributed 
logistical concept would benefit surface vessels. Another difference is that Khajavi (2014) 
used aircraft downtime to determine the operational and mission impacts. This research 
will utilize the formulas for operational availability and mission availability to determine 
the impacts to a Navy surface vessel. However, many of the formulas that were used by 
Khajavi (2014) will form the basis in developing formulas that can be used in applying 
costs to shipboard operations rather than aviation operations. These formulas will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter three.  
E. SUMMARY 
In this chapter we have discussed literature that presents the foundation of this 
work. This literature describes how the formulas in this scenario were obtained and 
provides a background on key logistical topics, such as distributed and centralized supply 
chain logistics models and Just-in-Time manufacturing. These formulas and concepts will 
show whether or not deployed ships will best be supported by integrating AM 
manufacturing into Navy supply chain logistics processes.  
32 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
33 
III. DATA FORMULATION 
A. FORMULAS IN DETAIL 
While the premise is similar to Khajavi’s (2014) work in the manner in which he 
used different costs to determine the total cost, this research will calculate the total cost 
using formulas that more closely follow the Navy surface fleet.  This section of Chapter III 
will discuss the formulas used in this analysis and how they may differ from the formulas 
that Khajavi (2014) utilized in his research.  
Labor cost:  The Labor cost will be calculated using the daily salaries of the 
personnel involved, which will include three E-6 Combat Systems Sailors and one Chief 
that conducted troubleshooting to find the origin of the problem with the CBSP, an E-4 
Supply Sailor that will submit the requisition into the supply system or open purchase the 
required part, an E-5 Combat Systems Sailor that will install the rotary joint and a 
Lieutenant Junior Grade Combat Systems Division Officer, such as the one in the article 
written by MCSN Leonard. In scenarios two and three there will be the Chief Engineer 
(scenario one will not include the use of AM) who will ultimately approve the use of AM 
for the rotary joint. The sum of the daily salary of these Sailors and Officers will be 
multiplied by the sum of the time it takes to troubleshoot the problem, the time it takes to 
place the part on order, the time it takes to wait on the part and the time it takes to install 
the rotary joint. According to the article written by MCSN Leonard (2018), it took three 
weeks to troubleshoot the repair, so 21 days will be used as the troubleshooting time. On 
average, it takes a Supply Logistics Specialist (LS) a day to receive the proper 
documentation and turn around and submit a requisition into the Navy supply system or 
order the part via the government purchase card. The article also discussed the wait time 
for the required part and how it could have taken anywhere from four to eight weeks before 
the part was received from the manufacturer. As an assumption, the required part was 
received in the amount of time discussed in the article, which is two months (60 days). 
Lastly, once received, the installation of the part by trained personnel should take no longer 
than day to complete. The discussed formula used for the Labor cost is shown below: 
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Labor cost = Daily salaries of personnel involved X MDT 
Transportation cost:  The cost for transportation in this case will be calculated 
assuming that the manufacturer takes the ownership of cost to provide transportation from 
their facility to the Navy logistics hub where the part will later be flown from the United 
States to Bahrain, the Navy’s 5th Fleet logistical hub. The fuel cost for the flight from the 
United States to Bahrain will present one of the factors that formulates the Transportation 
cost, which will include the daily salaries of two pilots as well as the cost of fuel for a C-
17 required to fly 5982 nautical miles (nm); the distance from Norfolk to Bahrain. Another 
factor in this equation is the fuel cost required to fly the part from Bahrain to the ship for 
delivery to the USS John C. Stennis. The cost of fuel will be multiplied by the average fuel 
used per flight out of Bahrain (run) in December. The product will be added to the cost of 
four total pilots (two pilots assumed from Norfolk to Bahrain and two pilots assumed from 
Bahrain to the ship) and the cost of fuel from Norfolk to Bahrain. The sum of these factors 
will be divided by the average number of parts carried aboard a C-17 within a three-month 
span to Bahrain. The discussed formula used for the Transportation cost is shown below: 
Transportation cost = (Cost of fuel for the aircraft used to deliver part X Average fuel used 
per run in December) + Fuel cost to fly part from U.S + Daily cost of four pilots/Average 
number of parts carried aboard C-17 within a three-month span to Bahrain  
Material cost:  The Material cost for scenario one will be the commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) price of the rotary joint taken from the quote from the manufacturer. In 
scenarios two and three, the Material cost will be the price of the raw material required to 
manufacture the part. Both formulas are shown below.  
Material cost = Price of part (scenario one); Raw material required for manufacturing 
(scenarios two and three) 
Facility cost:  The Facility cost will be utilized for scenario three as it is the only 
scenario that involves the use of a shore-based AM printer. The printer will be located 
within Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, which pays the country of Bahrain for the 
land, 233 buildings and includes water and electricity as outlined within the lease 
agreement. In 2018, the total price of the paid lease by the U.S. government was 
$54,770,470.50 to the government of Bahrain. This price will be divided by the number of 
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buildings at NSA Bahrain, which is 233 buildings as discussed. The quotient will be 
divided by the time that is required to manufacture the part at the shore facility, as shown: 
Facility cost = NSA Bahrain average building lease yearly rent (includes utilities)/ Time 
required to manufacture 
Mean Down Time (MDT):  MDT will be essential for both formulas of Operational 
Availability and Mission Availability and will be calculated as the sum of the time it takes 
the Sailor to troubleshoot the problem, the time it takes to order the part, the time it takes 
to wait on the part to arrive or wait on the part while being manufactured and lastly, the 
time it takes to install the new part. The discussed formula used for the MDT is shown 
below: 
Mean Down Time (MDT) = Troubleshooting time + Part wait time + Installation time 
Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM):  MTBM is the other piece to the 
Operational and Mission Availability formulas. This information was taken from the 
Maintenance Requirement Card (MRC) associated with the CBSP. Each MRC provides 
data on how to accurately conduct maintenance on a piece of equipment. Information on 
an MRC includes location of equipment, periodicity of maintenance, tools required to 
perform the maintenance and other pertinent information for performing the check 
successfully. As stated, the MRC provides the periodicity of maintenance on the CBSP 
which will be used as the MTBM. 
Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) = Taken from Maintenance Requirement Card 
(MRC) 
Operational Availability:  In the government contract with the Harris Corporation, 
it is stated that the Terminal Operational Availability threshold can be no less than 94% 
with the Operational Availability objective at 99%, as shown in Figure 10. For the system 
end-to-end, it is stated that the Operational Availability threshold be no less than 91% with 
the objective at 97%. In each scenario, the Operational Availability thresholds will be put 
under a microscope to determine if any scenarios were able to maintain these thresholds. 
The formula for Operational Availability is the previously discussed MTBM divided by 
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the sum of the MTBM and the MDT and finally multiplied by 100%. The discussed 
formula used for the MDT is shown below: 
Operational Availability = [MTBM/ (MTBM + MDT)] X 100% 
 
Figure 10. PEO C4I CBSP Requirements. Source: Glover (2016). 
Mission Availability:  This research also takes a closer look at Mission Availability 
to see how the introduction of AM effects Mission Availability. This formula will be shown 
by taking the mission uptime and dividing it by the sum of mission uptime and mission 
downtime and multiplying the quotient by 100%. The discussed formula used for the 
Mission Availability is shown below: 
Mission Availability = [Mission Uptime/ (Mission uptime + Mission downtime)] X 100% 
Machine Cost:  Although there are several types of AM printers, the AM printer 
suite that is aboard USS John C. Stennis will be used as the framework for this study and 
the associated cost for one of these machines will be identified as the Machine Cost. 
Unfortunately, there is not much to compare when it comes to machine cost. But it is 
important to realize that there are so many different variations of AM suites that can be 
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adopted into a shipboard environment or shore facility. This research uses the suite that 
currently exists aboard USS John C. Stennis, which consists of one UPrint SE Plus, two 
LulzBot Taz 6, one Maker Gear M3, one Boss Laser LS-1620HP, one Artec Eva and one 
Tormach PCNC 440. The Machine Cost for this research will be the cost of one UPrint SE 
Plus, which is priced at $18,000 commercially, divided by the number of parts that can be 
manufactured over its lifetime. Depending on completed maintenance, the assumption will 
be made that the machine will be replaced after 2500 hours of use and that it takes an 
average of five hours to manufacture each required part. The shore facility would possibly 
have more printers to satisfy requirements from several local ships and units, which may 
increase the machine cost and DMA cost.  
Machine Cost = Price of machine (UPrint SE Plus)/Number of parts manufactured over its 
lifetime   
Design/Manufacturing/Approval (DMA) Process cost:  The DMA cost is 
developed to capture the cost of the process that initializes with the design and develops 
into the manufacturing and ends in the approval of the part. This cost is important in 
providing substantiating data that offers an additional metric to measure AM production 
cost. The DMA formula:  
Design/Manufacturing/Approval (DMA) Process cost = Labor cost + Machine cost + 
Material cost for production of part + (Additional AM Operator daily labor cost X Time 
required to manufacture) 
For the following scenarios, the details of the calculations for all the metrics are 
given in Appendix A.  
B. SCENARIO ONE DATA 
The common scene-setting story with each scenario is that the USS John C. Stennis 
is currently deployed to the 5th Fleet AOR and conducting operations in the Persian Gulf 
when a casualty to their internet services occurs and the ship is left with a degraded internet 
capability. Sailors from CS9 Division quickly jump to action and immediately begin 
troubleshooting the CBSP radome to find the cause of the malfunction. Several hours turn 
into several days which turn into three weeks of troubleshooting efforts. Technicians have 
tuned into the antenna rotary switch as the cause of the problem and have conducted 
38 
research on the required part. After thorough research, they realize that the part will not be 
received for another two months. The story behind all three scenarios is based upon the 
actual event previously discussed in the article within Chapter II.  
The first scenario discussed will be the baseline for the other two scenarios since it 
defines how the current supply system is able to fill the requirement. In this particular case, 
the part was not found in the Navy stock system, probably due to the rarity of the required 
part and how infrequent the part breaks. Although not generally common that a part of this 
importance is not found in the stock system, it does occur with modest regularity that it 
must be acquired through an alternate method using open procurement sources using the 
ship’s government credit card purchasing process. It is this particular reason that this 
research will not include inventory holding costs in any of the three scenarios. In scenario 
two the raw material is maintained, but not within the ship’s stocked inventory. It is 
maintained locally in the engineering shop that utilizes the AM printers, meaning an 
inventory holding cost for the required raw material is at a miniscule cost and would not 
accurately portray how much inventory would need to be maintained aboard if scenario 
two was established throughout the fleet. In scenario three, since there is not currently AM 
capability in Bahrain and the scenario is conceptually based, it would be difficult to 
determine how much raw material stock would be required to support the number of 
deployed ship’s in the 5th Fleet AOR.  
Scenario one looks at the process of receiving the part aboard from the inception of 
the requisition to the receipt of the part, and lastly, the installation of the part. Table 2 















In this scenario, the Machine cost and DMA cost are zero because this scenario did 
not use an onboard AM printer.  
C. SCENARIO TWO DATA 
The storyline will remain the same as in scenario one, but instead of the part coming 
from the supply system, the part will be manufactured utilizing the onboard 3D printer. As 
shown in Table 3, the Transportation cost is zero due to the onboard AM capability and 
ship’s force manufacturing the part on their own. The time in this scenario is critical to 
minimizing the Labor cost and the Mean Down Time, which in turn, has increased the 
Operational Availability and Mission Availability outcomes. Also, the additional machine 
cost in scenario two is $36, while scenario one did not have a machine cost; however, the 
material cost was greater in scenario one as it used the COTS product from the 
manufacturer. This scenario is the most closely associated to the event that occurred on 





Labor cost  $97,337.52 
Transportation cost $2,827.40 
Facility cost $0 
Material cost $5,250 
Machine cost $0 
DMA cost $0 
MDT 2,208hrs 
MTBM  2,160hrs 
Operational Availability .49 
Mission Availability  .75 
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Figure 11. Manufactured Part Aboard USS John C. Stennis. Source: Grim (2019). 
D. SCENARIO THREE DATA 
The difference between scenario three and the other two scenarios is that it presents 
the additive manufacturing of the antenna rotary switch at the nearest 5th fleet logistical 
hub, which in this case is in Bahrain. Since this scenario is mostly conceptual in nature, 
there is no way of knowing at this point how much raw material inventory would be 
maintained, who would operate the printer nor how long it would take to manufacture or 
deliver the part in this environment. This is another reason why the Inventory Holding cost 
will not be used in this research. However, the assumption will be made that the Machine 
cost will be the same if not similar to the AM suite that is aboard USS John C. Stennis. 
Facility cost will be presented in this scenario and is show in Table 4.  
Scenario Two 
Metric Quantity 
Labor cost  $25,119.36 
Transportation cost   $0 
Facility cost $0 
Material cost $39.23 
Machine cost $36 
DMA cost $43,263.55 
MDT 576hrs 
MTBM  2160hrs 
Operational Availability .79 
Mission Availability  .93 
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The turnaround time will be assumed to be a week. This gives enough time for the 
part requirement, including specifications, to be formalized and verified before 
manufacturing. The seven-day estimate will be used to calculate the DMA, the Labor cost, 
the MDT and the Facility cost.  
E. SUMMARY 
The data collected in this research will be compared more closely in the following 
chapter, but looking at the differences at a glance, a distributed-enabled ship concept would 
provide lower capital investment costs, and lower transportation costs. Nonetheless, if the 
Navy continues to see JIT as the production method of the future, AM must play a major 
role in this strategy. In the meantime, inventory hubs will continue to be utilized while AM 
becomes an integral part of the future JIT strategy.  
Scenario Three 
Metric Quantity 
Labor cost  $31,399.20 
Transportation cost   $253.04 
Facility cost $33,580.91 
Material cost $39.23 
Machine cost $36 
DMA cost $50,173.15 
MDT 720hrs 
MTBM  2160hrs 
Operational Availability .75 
Mission Availability  .92 
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IV. RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In this chapter we will compare the findings from the three scenarios and discuss 
which AM distribution methods will perform best for deployed ships as shown in Table 5. 
Lastly, the recommendations that should be considered going forward will be presented 
and supported with a thorough analysis. In comparison, the three scenarios provide a solid 
framework that determines the best way to utilize AM on deployed ships.  
Table 5. Compared Scenario Data. 
 
A. FINDINGS 
The scenario highlighted in green represents the recommended course of action for 
deployed ships. This scenario represents not only the best total cost benefit to the Navy, 
but more importantly, the highest operational and mission availability to our deployed 
ships. The scenario in yellow could become a recommended solution, depending on the 
turn-around time of the shore facility in manufacturing and delivering the part in an 
expeditious manner.  
In scenario two, the most significant findings were the 74% decrease in labor cost 
and MDT, and approximate $2,800 difference in transportation cost per part in comparison 
 






Labor cost  $97,337.52 $25,119.36 $31,399.20 
Transportation cost $2,827.40 $0 $253.04 
Facility cost $0 $0 $33,580.91 
Material cost $5,250 $39.23 $39.23 
Machine cost $0 $36 $36 
DMA cost $0 $25,299.55 $32,209.15 
MDT 2,208hrs 576hrs 720hrs 
MTBM  2,160hrs 2,160hrs 2,160hrs 
Operational Availability .49 .79 .75 
Mission Availability  .75 .93 .92 
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to scenario one. In 2015, transportation costs accounted for nearly 60% of the total U.S. 
logistics expenditures (Gager, 2017). The remaining 40% consisted of 30% inventory costs 
and 10% administrative costs. So, the high number of transportation costs are rather 
common, and provides one of the greatest benefits for the use of AM on deployed ships. 
The other finding of 74% decreases in both labor costs and down time directly correlates 
to the “dead time” that was involved in waiting for the part to arrive.  
In scenario three, there was also a corollary decrease in the Mean Down Time and 
Labor Costs from scenario one. Although not as wide of a gap as scenario two, it still saw 
a 68% decrease, which is significant. And although there was an increase in transportation 
cost from scenario two, it still saw 91% increase in cost savings. Another finding to discuss 
was the DMA cost increase from scenario two. The nearly $7,000 increase was a result of 
the estimated turnaround time that the AM operator took at the shore facility. For this 
reason, it is believed that scenario three would also become a recommended method if the 
shore facility could improve turnaround times to less than seven days.  
Labor cost was highest in scenario one mainly due to the amount of time that 
elapsed in waiting for the part. Scenario two maintained the least labor cost, followed   
closely by scenario three. The similarities in scenarios two and three labor cost are 
attributed to the troubleshooting time, which was unaffected prior to the disposition of the 
required part. In other words, troubleshooting time remained constant throughout all three 
scenarios and will not be affected. Conceptually, scenario three could have even closer 
costs to scenario two if the urgency at the shore facility was great enough that enabled the 
part to be manufactured in less than seven days. In all, the down time seems to be the 
driving factor between the three scenarios.  
The transportation cost showed quite a disparity between the three scenarios. Since 
scenario two had the AM technology aboard, this nullified all transportation costs. In 
scenario one, the required part was only able to be purchased in the United States, which 
is why the part had to travel such a long distance. The distance and the added costs of fuel 
and additional pilots is why the transportation costs were so much higher than in the other 
two scenarios. If the part was kept in stock in the logistics hub in Bahrain this would have 
brought the cost down considerably, however would have increased the inventory holding 
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costs. The rarity of failure in the part provided little justification to keep the part stocked 
in the supply system. In scenario three, the transportation costs were considerably less since 
the part would have been made locally and would only have to travel to the nearby ship 
where operations were currently being conducted.  
The material cost was considerably higher in scenario one, since the required part 
had to be purchased directly from the manufacturer. Scenarios two and three used the price 
of the raw material used to manufacture the part, which was ABS plastic. The cost of the 
yellow ABS material is $39.23 per kilogram, which was enough to manufacture the rotary 
switch. The quoted price by the manufacturer was $5,250. Since the material aboard 
STENNIS is not maintained on the ship as stock, but rather procured on an as-needed basis 
the material cost for scenarios two and three did not include the amount of material on 
hand. If the cost was included, the price difference would have been miniscule in 
comparison to the price that was quoted by the company to manufacture the part.  
The DMA cost was effective in providing a metric that clearly assigned a value to 
the design, manufacturing and approval process from design to output. Scenario two and 
three were the only scenarios that had a DMA cost, since it was not applicable in scenario 
one. There was a 27% increase in DMA cost from scenario two to three, which as discussed 
previously, was largely due to an increase in manufactured wait time at the shore AM 
facility. Another less notable difference was that the cost of the additional AM operator 
(assumed to be the rank of an E-5- same as in scenario two) cost was greater in scenario 
three due to the amount of time they would expect to be working, which was seven days.  
The MDT seems to be the determining factor between many of the formulas. The 
reason is likely due to the wait time for the part to be either manufactured or received that 
drives the increased costs. In scenario one, the wait time is seventy-one days not including 
the troubleshooting time, which is an additional twenty-one days. Scenario two was a total 




The Operational Availability saw an increase of 30% in scenario two, while 
scenario three saw a 26% increase. These numbers show that the effects of AM are greater 
than solely cost benefits to the Navy. It has benefit that is quantifiable in operational 
readiness. Although the Operational Availability is still lower than the expected 91% 
Operational Availability threshold set by NAVSEA’s Program Executive Office (PEO), 
the increase in scenarios two and three prove that AM capability can have dramatic effects 
on operational readiness. And perhaps, with the reduction of MDT through the use of 
increased inventory of bulk raw material stock or increased knowledge and skill in using 
AM technology by shipboard personnel, Operational Availability will increase further. 
Nonetheless, if these improvements can influence the responsiveness of one part, for one 
mission, on one ship, envision what the affects could be on a grander scale.  
Mission availability also saw an increase in scenarios two and three of 19% and 
18%, respectively, which underlines the positive use of mission sustainment on deployed 
ships utilizing AM. Like operational availability, the mission availability metric provides 
another determining factor for the use of AM throughout the surface fleet that must be 
considered.  
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
In order to see how different parts may react to this logic, three parts were selected 
to conduct a sensitivity analysis. The first is a quick release pin which has over 550 parts 
in the stock system, the second is a plastic capacitor which has two in the stock system, 
and lastly a shut-off valve cartridge which has only one in the stock system.  
Applying the quick release pin to the first scenario, the Labor cost was $26,612.64 
due to decrease in part wait time. Since there are so many in the stock system, the part 
should be filled relatively quickly and should decrease the part wait time. The MDT for 
this part was 1152 hours or 48 days. Although Labor cost was less than on USS John C. 
Stennis, the Transportation cost was actually more. Since the pin was located in 
Jacksonville, the additional trip from Jacksonville to Norfolk for the transatlantic flight to 
Bahrain increased the transportation cost by $176 due to the additional pilots and added 
fuel consumption. There was an increase in transportation costs for all three parts since 
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they were located in Georgia, California and Jacksonville, respectively. Furthermore, the 
correlation between the part wait time and the cost of labor, the MDT, the DMA, the  
Operational Availability and the Mission Availability also showed true for the three 
parts as in the part on USS John C. Stennis. Lastly, the costs associated with scenario two 
for all three parts showed lower as was the case for the scenario in this research. 
Operational Availability and Missional Availability data was inconclusive since it could 
not be determined what system these parts belonged to and how each part would affect that 
system.  
C. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 
After discussing the provided metrics of this research, a primary and alternate 
method of AM distribution will be presented that provides the most benefit to the Navy 
and its’ surface fleet. As shown in Table 6, the total operating cost was calculated based on 
the metrics provided in this research. The total operating cost for scenario one shows the 
highest cost at $105,414.92 and the lowest operational and mission availabilities, while 
scenario three presents the next highest total operating cost of $66,043.10 and a jump in 
mission and operational availabilities, second only to scenario two. Scenario two presents 
the lowest total operating cost of $25,299.55 and the highest mission and operational 
availability.  
Table 6. Scenario Combined Total Operating Costs. 
 
1. Primary Recommended Solution 
Outfitting the entire surface fleet with AM capabilities is a daunting task, as well 
as an expensive one, if looked at with a short-term view. However, as shown, the effects 
 






Total Operating Cost $105,414.92 $25,299.55 $66,043.10 
Operational Availability .49 .79 .75 
Mission Availability  .75 .93 .92 
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that AM capabilities will have aboard ships will not only save the Navy money in the long-
term, but will increase the operational and mission readiness of our deployers. In the short 
term, outfitting the Navy’s deploying ships first, will help in the prioritization of funding 
and combat readiness. Furthermore, not every platform needs the same AM suite in order 
to increase the ship’s readiness. For example, with the AM suite on board the USS John C. 
Stennis being so robust, the smaller ships in the Strike Group, such as the DDGs and CGs, 
can carry a reduced capability. This will allow them to manufacture certain items and if 
needed, can reach back to the carrier within their Strike Group to manufacture items that 
they don’t have the capability to make. A possible representation of this concept is shown 
in Figure 12. This solution would drastically minimize the reliance of the supply chain and 
allow ships to take charge of their own readiness.  
 
Figure 12. Proposed “Smallboy” AM Suite versus Carrier AM Suite. 
2. Alternate Recommended Solution 
Scenario three provided insights into an alternative solution that could provide 
nearly the same amount of operational and mission readiness, but without the greater 
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upfront costs required to outfit the surface fleet with AM capabilities. In this research, the 
logistical hub was Bahrain, but placing a robust AM capability at every logistical hub 
mentioned in chapter two, the surface fleet would have access to rapid manufacturing near 
the point of origin. This solution may also provide more oversight on the manufacturing 
process. If the expediting process is sufficient enough to decrease the ship’s wait time, the 
operational and mission availability would be nearly equal to that of the wait time if the 
ship had its own AM capability. Transportation costs would become a factor with this 
solution; however, the financial impact would still be minimal compared to the costs of 
transportation from the inventory control point. This concept is illustrated in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13. Suggested AM Manufacturing Hubs. 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the results from the data that this research produced. The 
results showed that clearly AM has a place in today’s Navy. Operationally, AM provides 
the U.S. warships the ability to independently increase readiness with minimal supply chain 
involvement. AM also provides greater implications financially to the Navy and will lessen 
the long-term transportation costs, which make-up a majority of the Navy’s supply chain 
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costs. Recommendations that will make the Navy stronger have been provided for the 
distribution of AM capabilities. These recommendations should be internalized and acted 
upon to increase our fleet’s readiness. Whichever recommendation is put into action will 
make an immediate impact on today’s Navy.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS  
Warfighter support is the primary reason for this research. How can the Navy make 
the lives of Sailors easier so they can bring the fight to the enemy without having to worry 
about food or parts?  This study has ultimately shown that ship deployments are best 
supported by integrating AM manufacturing into Navy supply chain logistics processes.  
The environment for evolution and change is here and the Navy must commit to making 
lethality important while minimizing forward logistics support systems. Granted, 
operational support is not always at the forefront of any major conflicts, but as a support 
function, AM provides the necessary means for Navy ships to take command of their own 
readiness.  
The vision of both the CNO and OPNAV N4 is clear and provides the logistical 
objectives the Navy is striving to achieve. This research has shown that through the use of 
AM, operational and mission availability will increase the more it is utilized. It also 
continues the minimization of the logistics and “iron mountains” within the Navy’s battle 
space, as described by Tuttle (2013).  
The result of this research will hopefully add to the increased attention that AM has 
been given from the Navy over the past few years and lead to the widespread 
implementation of AM in support of Navy surface deployers. The determination on 
whether ship deployments can be improved by integrating AM within the use of the 
standard supply chain has been strengthened, while showing the cost benefits the Navy 
could gain in implementing this new technology.  
The answer to the question presented in chapter one has been confirmed through 
this research, “Does the potential operational impact justify the AM total cost ownership 
for the Navy?”  The operational and mission impacts outweigh, both in the long and short-
term, the cost of AM implementation. With the increases of both Operational Availability 
and Mission Availability it is shown that the results of AM are not only financial, but 
operationally quantifiable to the Navy’s surface fleet. The results have further shown the 
benefits for the widespread implementation of AM aboard ships, as well as the benefits for 
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the alternative solution for the implementation of AM at key logistical hubs located 
globally.  
The next stage of logistical readiness begins with the implementation of AM 
throughout the Navy surface community. CAPT Armen Kurdian, Director of Engineering 
and Product support for the Naval Supply Systems Command stated, “Additive 
manufacturing could bring about revolutionary changes to the Navy Supply System, with 
an associated paradigm shift from the current order and stocking system to implementation 
of just-in-time inventory. It has the potential to move the point of manufacture for hundreds 
of components and parts closer to the point of demand” (NSWC Dahlgren Division 
Corporate Communications Division, 2016). Ultimately, AM will be the catalyst to this 
shift in thought on global logistics.  
A. FURTHER RESEARCH  
Through this research development, there have been a few gaps that could provide 
opportunities for further research. The first is the potential use of recycled material aboard 
the ship that utilizes AM. The use of hard plastic material is becoming the norm with 
regards to manufacturing. If the Navy is able to reutilize the abundance of plastic and 
aluminum metal already aboard the ship, this could potentially reap huge rewards, both 
environmentally and financially. The second opportunity for further research is analyzing 
the contracting process more in-depth to resolve copyright issues that are inhibiting the use 
of manufacturer data files, which can be used to create the parts the ships need. Perhaps 
the answer lies in the payment of royalty fees to the manufacturer each time the Navy 
manufactures its own part, much in the same way that music is sold on iTunes. Thirdly, an 
analysis on how the use of AM by suppliers affect the Navy’s AM integration approach. 
And lastly, an analysis of how the Navy supply system will change, with regards to stock-
inventory levels with the widespread use of AM, would be another great area for further 
research.  
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B. FINAL THOUGHT 
     As this research has discussed, there are several positive gains to be made through 
the use of AM throughout the Navy. If the Navy is able to harness the use of AM, it will 
not only make financial sense, but operational sense as well.  
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APPENDIX A. DATA 
Scenario One Data 
Labor cost = Daily salaries of personnel involved X MDT  
(282.29 + 90.45 + 314.88 + 96.80 + 134.96 + 127.26) X (21days + 1day + 70days + 1day) = 97,337.52 
Transportation cost = (Cost of fuel for the aircraft used to deliver part X Average fuel used per run in 
December) + Fuel cost to fly part from U.S + Daily cost of four pilots/Average number of parts carried 
aboard C-17 within a three-month span to Bahrain  
2.47/gl X 1102gl = 2721.94 
2721.94 + 112,885.13 + 466.84 + 415.16/ 41.2= $2,827.40 
Material cost = Price of part from manufacturer (Appendix. B.) 
Facility cost = Not applicable in scenario one 
Mean Down Time (MDT) = Troubleshooting time + Requisition/Open Purchase time + Part wait time + 
Installation time 
21days + 70days + 1 = 92days X 24hrs=2208hrs 
Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) = Taken from Maintenance Requirement Card (MRC) 
Quarterly 90days X 24hrs = 2160hrs 
Operational Availability = [MTBM/ (MTBM + MDT)] X 100% 
2160/(2160 + 2208) = .49 
Mission Availability = [Mission Uptime/ (Mission uptime + Mission downtime)] X 100% 
273/(273 + 92) = .75 
Total Operating Cost = Labor cost + Transportation cost + Facility cost + Material cost 
$97,337.52 + $2,827.40 + $0 + $5,250 = $105,414.92 
Scenario Two Data 
Labor cost = Daily salaries of personnel involved X MDT  
(282.29 + 90.45 + 314.88 + 96.80 + 134.96 + 127.26) X (21days + 1day + 1day + 1day) = 25,119.36 
Machine cost = Price of machines (UPrint SE Plus)/Number of parts manufactured over its lifetime  SE 
Print Plus 18,000   
Number of parts manufactured over its lifetime: 2500/5=500 
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18000/500=$36 
Material cost = 39.23 (price of yellow ABS material) 
Facility cost = Not applicable in scenario two 
Design/Manufacturing/Approval (DMA) process cost = Labor Cost + Machine cost + Material cost for 
production of part + (Additional AM Operator daily labor cost X Time required to manufacture) 
25,119.36 + 36 + 39.23 + (104.96 x 1) = 25,299.55 
Mean Down Time (MDT) = Troubleshooting time + Requisition/Open Purchase time + Part wait time + 
Installation time 
21days + 1day + 1day + 1day = 24days X 24 hours = 576hrs 
Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) = Taken from Maintenance Requirement Card (MRC) = 
2160hrs 
Operational Availability = [MTBM/ (MTBM + MDT)] X 100% 
2160/(2160 + 576) = .79 
Mission Availability = [Mission Uptime/ (Mission uptime + Mission downtime)] X 100% 
8184/(8184 + 576) = .93 
Transportation cost = Not applicable in scenario 2 
 
Total Operating Cost = DMA cost + Transportation cost + Facility cost  
$25,299.55 + $0 + $0 = $25,299.55 
Scenario Three Data 
Labor cost = Daily salaries of personnel involved X MDT  
1046.64 X (21days + 1day + 7days + 1day) = 31,399.20 
Machine cost = Price of machines (UPrint SE Plus)/Number of parts manufactured over its lifetime   
SE Print Plus 18,000   
Number of parts manufactured over its lifetime: 2500/5=500 
18000/500=$36 
Material cost = 39.23 (price of yellow ABS material) 
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Facility cost = NSA Bahrain average building lease yearly rent (includes utilities)/ Time required to 
manufacture 
$235,066.39/ 7 days = $33,580.91 
Design/Manufacturing/Approval (DMA) process cost = Labor Cost + Machine cost + Material cost for 
production of part + (Additional AM Operator daily labor cost X Time required to manufacture) 
31,399.20 + 36 + 39.23 + (104.96 X 7) = 32,209.15 
Mean Down Time (MDT) = Troubleshooting time + Requisition/Open Purchase time + Part wait time + 
Installation time 
21days + 1day + 7days + 1day = 30days X 24hrs = 720hrs 
Mean Time Between Maintenance (MTBM) = Taken from Maintenance Requirement Card (MRC) 
2160hrs 
Operational Availability = [MTBM/ (MTBM + MDT)] X 100% 
2160/(2160 + 720) = .75 
Mission Availability = [Mission Uptime/ (Mission uptime + Mission downtime)] X 100% 
335/(335 + 30) = .92 
Transportation cost = [(Cost of fuel for the aircraft used to deliver part X Average fuel used per run in 
December) + Daily cost of two pilots] /Average number of parts delivered to ship  
2.47/gl X 1102gl = 2721.94 
[2721.94 + 233.42 + 207.58]/12.5 = 253.04 
Total Operating Cost = DMA cost + Transportation cost + Facility cost  
$32,209.15 + $253.04 + $33,580.91 = $66,043.10 
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